that paints 'the Terrible Turk' as the antonym of desired national characteristics and as solely responsible for relative political or economic backwardness. 1 A variation on this tendency can be seen in Turkey, which experienced a revulsion against the imperial legacy following the founding of the republic in . 2 The incontrovertible, widespread misery that accompanied each stage of the empire's break-up makes this negative image easily believable.
Among the most effective tools for working the anti-Ottoman message into the national, and nationalist, histories of the successor states has been their control of education and the media. The state in the Balkans, Turkey, and the Arab lands has tended to control, either directly through finance and administration or indirectly through legislated restrictions, not only schools and television but also the academy (universities, research institutes, and publishing houses), in which state-sponsored national history predominates. Universities in the successor states have produced surprisingly few historians of the empire; the training they offer has been geared to producing specialists in national history during the Ottoman period. The proclivity of such historians to concentrate on the 'national rebirth' and 'independence struggle' phases of their nations' Ottoman past has been one sign of the strength of the national paradigm. 3 The propagandist model of history, pushed by the state, has established effective boundaries to deviation: scholars and literati who have strayed over them have risked public vilification and harassment. The prosecution of Orhan Pamuk by the Turkish government in  for comments about the killing of Armenians in the First World War is a recent, high-profile example.
The stereotype of 'Turkish domination' fostered by nation-builders gives a veneer of historical justification to extremist politics. While the policies promoted by skewed history may face criticism from international law and human rights, the 'history' disseminated to justify them to public opinion has lived on and proved influential abroad as well as at home. Every citation of Ottoman history to explain current events warrants more critical attention. Manipulation of Ottoman history, which takes several forms, has been applied to a variety of national purposes other than nation-building. The straw man of the 'Terrible Turk' is used to mobilize popular antagonism towards everything Muslim and/or Turkish, most pervasively in the Balkan states. Whereas Arab nationalist regimes, such as Baathist Iraq and Syria, have placed greater emphasis on the anti-Turkish, rather than anti-Muslim, message, the secular regime in Turkey has stressed the weakness of the explicitly Muslim Ottoman state and the problems caused by other ethnic groups, both Muslim and Christian. Similarly, selective evidence from the Ottoman era is used to build support for a specific goal, usually a claim to land. The two manipulations have been most effective when used in tandem. The purposes to which manipulated, politicized, history lends itself include both domestic and foreign policy issues. Five categories of politics in the guise of Ottoman history have recurred regularly since the end of the empire in .
The first category is border disputes arising from the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Some cases of politics-as-history claim that territories were wrongfully divided from their natural ethnic, social, or economic hinterlands. The most widely known instances are the long-running dispute over Macedonia and the briefly realized Iraqi claim to Kuwait. In the case of Macedonia, historical and ethnic claims to territory based on Ottoman and pre-Ottoman history have been asserted by Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and the Macedonian Slavs; the historical disputes continued long after the Balkan Wars of -, fought to decide the fate of Ottoman Macedonia. 1 In the case of Kuwait, the Iraqi version of history, since the s, claims that Kuwait was an integral part of Ottoman Iraq until the British in  bought the allegiance of a Kuwaiti sheikh with a secret treaty. Other territorial disputes have included those between Turkey and Britain and Iraq over Mosul; Turkey and Syria over Alexandretta; Qatar and Bahrain over the Hawar islands and Zubara; and over the status of Lebanon as a historically legitimate entity independent of Syria. 2 While the idea of historic oppression by the Ottomans plays a part in these disputes, the salient form of historical distortion is the avowal of claims 'legitimated' by manufactured, misinterpreted, or anecdotal evidence from the Ottoman era.
The second category is claims to sacred land. The most obvious cases of the use of Ottoman 'history' to assert rights to 'historic heartlands' not inhabited predominantly by members of the group making the claim are Kosovo and Palestine. Serbs have treated Kosovo as crucial to their national identity, despite having been a minority of its inhabitants since at least the nineteenth century. 1 According to their version of their history, the Ottoman Empire stripped them of control over Kosovo following the battle of Kosovo Polje in , in which the Serbian king, Lazar, chose a heavenly kingdom over the preservation of his earthly one. Later, in , the Ottomans supposedly drove Serbs out of Kosovo and resettled the land with Albanians to ensure that the evicted Serbs could not return. 2 In the dispute over Palestine, the first generations of Zionists expressed their idea of the area under Ottoman rule with the slogan 'a land without a people for a people without a land'. They implied that Palestine was sparsely populated in the late Ottoman period, impoverished by government incompetence, corruption, and inability to stop Bedouin banditry. 3 Immigration by Zionists could only benefit Palestine, by making the desert bloom, an idea developed by later propagandists who assert that a Palestinian state would implode, as it could not develop a sustainable economy. Palestinians have responded by highlighting the vibrancy of the Arab communities in Palestine before the onset of significant Zionist immigration. 4 The debates over the history of Ottoman Palestine have led recently to research in quantities unusual in the successor states; more unusual has been the freedom to challenge the nationalist history enjoyed by Israeli scholars, among whom are some of the best Ottomanists at work today. 5 The third category is the origins of the communities of Muslims in Europe. Balkan states have repeatedly wished to solve a 'problem' inherited from the Ottoman Empire: the continued existence of large Muslim minorities. At root, this is a product of an enduring desire to be recognized as 'European', rather than as 'Oriental' and thus dim, decadent, and despotic. Significant Muslim populations are blemishes on the Balkan nations' self-image. To determine the exact origins of Balkan Muslim populations is impossible, but they include local converts, Turkish-speaking settlers, relocated refugees, and migrants. While nation-builders in the Balkans have preferred to view Muslims as descendants of local converts, rather than of Turkish settlers, the issue of conversion presents its own ideological problems. How could members of the nation 'turn Turk'? Forced conversion has been one ready explanation. 1 Bulgaria, faced with economic and political sclerosis in the s, initiated a programme designed to Bulgarize its large Turkish minority that took previous attempts to 'renationalize' both Bulgarian-and Turkish-speaking Muslims to a more brutal level. Official history claimed that the large Turcophone Muslim minority was not ethnically Turkish but descended from Bulgarians forcibly converted to Islam in the seventeenth century. This ersatz history was hardly to the taste of Bulgaria's Turks, tens of thousands of whom fled the country to escape the renunciation of their religion and the acceptance of Bulgarian names forced upon them at gunpoint. 2 The issue of the origin of Muslim populations also played an obvious role not only in Kosovo, but also in the war in Bosnia. Serbs (and to an extent Croats) portrayed Bosnian Muslims as descendants of Serbs (or Croats) whom the Ottomans forced or enticed to convert. Thus, the absorption of Bosnia into Serbia and Croatia would right an anomaly inherited from the Ottoman Empire. Bosnia's Muslims traced their roots to the independent medieval kingdom of Bosnia, which, supposedly, had been a stronghold of non-Catholic, non-Orthodox, Bogomil Christianity. 3 Even in Albania with its Muslim majority, national history tends to explain conversion as a simple issue of convenience, as Albanians supposedly never cared much about religion. 4 On these grounds, Enver Hoxha's regime enforced atheism. Political campaigns to obliterate Muslim minorities in the Balkans have made little use of even selective documentary evidence. In the case supported by the clearest evidence -that of the forced conversions of Bulgarians in the seventeenth century -the documents cited proved to have been nineteenth-century forgeries. 1 Related to the issue of the origins of Muslim communities is the fourth category: the nature of the relationship between religious and ethnic communities under Ottoman rule. While Arab nationalists assert that ethnicity separated Arabs from their Turkish overlords, the most notable case of disagreement about intercommunal relations in the Ottoman period involves Cyprus. Greek Cypriots, who seek the reunification of the island, and independence, cite a history that stresses the unity of the island and its people (in resistance to Istanbul's 'oppression'), and claims that many Turkish Cypriots are descendants of local converts to Islam during the Ottoman period. Turkish Cypriots cite a history of separation of Christian and Muslim communities on the island and claim descent from immigrants from Ottoman Anatolia. 2 The fifth category is state brutality, the political condition often associated with the word Ottoman, the negative image at its purest. Relations between two members of NATO, Greece and Turkey, have been bedevilled by animosities inherited from the Ottoman period, when brutal unconventional war was waged by both sides from the Greek revolt of the s to the Greek occupation of western Anatolia in -. Similarly, in the politicking over the fate of the Armenians during the First World War, Armenians charge the Ottomans (Turks) with genocide and Turks reject the charge. 3 Every nationalism to arise in the post-Ottoman states has claimed that 'the Turks' oppressed the nation: the 'Turkish Yoke' became a generic explanation in Balkan states for lack of economic development in comparison with Germany, France, and Britain. 4 The idea that the nation had sacrificed itself to save 'Europe' from the heathen horde survived into the Communist period, when nationalism might have been subverted as incompatible with class ideology. The 'Turkish Yoke' became the most acceptable explanation for the lack of both a significant capitalist class and a true proletariat, and hence the lack of enthusiasm for progressive totalitarianism. 1 It also helped to demonize Turkey, the powerful anchor of NATO's eastern flank. Only in Yugoslavia did the danger from old-style nationalism outweigh the benefits, given the patched-together multi-ethnic character of the state. Even in the Middle East during the post- nationalist struggle for independence from British and French control, Arabs adopted the notion that Ottoman internal repression and external weakness had left them vulnerable to European imperialism. 2 Several characteristics of such intersections of history and politics are worth noting. The first is the anachronism of the modern nationalists' vision. Shaping policy in the present to address a perceived problem of the past is hardly wise, even if fairly common. If the military have long been lambasted for getting ready to fight the last war, in which senior commanders held junior rank, what should be said of politicians who want to rewrite a history of which they have had no personal experience? To use 'the Turks' as justification is to betray ignorance of the nature and interests of the Ottoman state, its relationship with its subjects, and the attitudes and beliefs of the population. Such actions exaggerate the immutability of group identities, and assume that the nation state is timeless, without beginning, end, or significant evolution. This assumption, accepted unconsciously by many, became the worldwide standard only in the twentieth century, often after much bloodshed. 3 Officially sanctioned histories treat Muslims in the Balkans, for example, as descendants of members of the nation (be it Bulgarian, Serbian, or Albanian) who were urged or forced to convert, not only because of their membership in a nation that resisted oppression, but also because the Ottoman oppressors were as intolerant of heterogeneity among their subjects as present-day Balkan nationalist states. In Cyprus, Greek Cypriots can no more conceive of Ottoman Istanbul as having been the ultimate source of redress against misdeeds by local notables, than Turkish Cypriots can imagine a society characterized by regular interaction across communal lines (let alone passage through the lines by conversion): both groups read current nationalist norms back through the centuries. Yet the evidence for less violent, routine relations in the pre-national age is there for anyone who cares to look. 4 Closely related to anachronism is the lack of domestic debate about these versions of national history. The successor nations to the Ottomans have no monopoly on the use of history to buttress arguments over current policy. The vindication of historical claims is one of the few remaining justifications for the offensive in international disputes that holds much credibility. 1 China and Japan have turned a dispute over history books used in schools into an expression of their rival political and economic ambitions in Asia. For variations on the theme of mythologized history in the United States, one can look to Washington in , where supposed parallels between Saddam Hussein's aims and the Cuban missile crisis of  were drawn repeatedly by those in favour of firm action in defence of freedom in the Middle East. Comparisons between post-war Iraq and the Allied occupations of Japan and Germany after  also became fashionable among pundits, as did citations of lessons from Britain's struggle to control Iraq in the s; they distracted attention from the debate over the extent to which US plans suited present-day conditions. Yet at least the analogies were debated in the media, particularly in newspapers such as the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, and the Washington Post. In most of the Ottoman cases, dissenting voices have been weaker; populist myths have been allowed to set the parameters of debate. History is assumed to prove the justice of a claim to a territory or people.
Such myths have been constructed with impunity because Ottoman history is an orphan, lacking a guardian state able and determined to rebut derogatory assertions. The Ottoman Empire is gone, and modern Turkey is far from being its reincarnation: neither can tell Ottoman tales. Ottoman Turkish is a language as dead as the empire that used it, which makes the investigation of Ottoman records laborious and time-consuming. Nonetheless, the research proves worthwhile. Some claims have weakened in strength -those concerning Bulgarian conversion and unpopulated Palestine -partly owing to the critical mass of published scholarship. Ottomans themselves? 1 The Ottoman records, by adding shades of grey to the black-and-white history of nationalist policy makers, reveal the folly of (mis)using history to justify policy.
This article and another to follow examine in detail the complementary cases of Kuwait and Kosovo. The former involves an attempt to erase a modern border and add territory to a nation state, whereas the latter, which focuses on the ethno-national character of one region in a nation state, has evolved into a question of secession. The two cases draw on different elements of Ottoman history: the argument over the status of Kuwait, which attracted attention shortly before the First World War, is also part of European imperial history, while that over the ethnic status of Kosovo, which dates back to the fourteenth century, belongs to the history of Ottoman domestic affairs. Although the case of Kuwait draws on the nationalist imagery of Turkish oppression, it hinges upon the interpretation of empirical evidence for a few crucial events. The arguments over Kosovo, which are less sharply focused, rely heavily upon crude images of Ottoman oppression. The two cases thus represent the range of issues involved in employing historical justifications drawing upon the Ottoman past to warrant present-day claims. * * * * * O  A , the president of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, attacked Kuwait, and within twenty-four hours the Iraqi army had conquered the country. By the time the occupying forces were driven out in February , Kuwait had been systematically looted, and about six hundred Kuwaitis taken to Iraq by Saddam's secret police are thought to have been executed. While many fellow Arabs were jealous of Kuwait's oil wealth, the brutality for which Saddam's regime was well known should have aroused sympathy for anyone falling under his control. Yet Saddam's actions proved surprisingly popular in some Arab countries, and his gamble that the contravention of international law would go unchecked almost succeeded. His near-success is explained in part by his successful disguising of his motives.
The attack on Kuwait arose from Saddam's failure to defeat Iran in the Gulf war of -. Once Iraq's inept attempt to seize Iran's oil-rich province of Khuzistan had been checked, Iraq's access to the Persian Gulf was impeded as the war zone moved in  to the former border between Iraq and Iran, the Shatt al-Arab waterway and the Faw peninsula. Before risking another attack on Iran, Saddam aimed to secure his supply route by seizing Kuwait's excellent port. He also needed money. With Kuwait's petroleum reserves added to Iraq's, Iraq would become the dominant voice in OPEC: the other leading producer, Saudi Arabia, would appease him once he had annihilated their mutual neighbour. Saddam made no secret of his wish to see world oil prices rise. Kuwait, which had funnelled money to Iraq to keep the Iraqi military supplied with the advanced weaponry it needed to stave off Iran's 'human wave' offensives, made the mistake of asking for repayment. By seizing the country, Saddam hoped not only to pillage the Kuwaiti treasury but also to erase one of Iraq's biggest debts. Such reasons could hardly be proclaimed publicly. 1 Several months before the invasion, Iraq began to complain that Kuwait was stealing petroleum from an oil field that straddled their border. Squabbles between states well endowed with hydrocarbons usually excite little interest from those in lower-income brackets. Saddam's attempt to justify violence by reference to Ottoman history tacitly acknowledged the need for a more stirring public-relations message. That later still he added the promise to spend some of the newly acquired wealth on supporting the Palestinian cause only sweetened the propaganda (and prompted the Palestine Liberation Organization to support him, although it had received more aid from the Gulf states, including Kuwait, than from Iraq). Saddam drew upon a version of history well known to Iraqis, and it resonated with them and with other Arabs. 2 Iraq's claim to Kuwait derived from the inclusion of both in the Ottoman Empire. Although Iraq, as a country, was only created after Britain's victory over the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Ottomans had treated much of the territory that became Iraq as a unified military frontier, the 'Hıtta-i Irakiye'. The notion that Iraq itself was simply the creation of the British following their victory over the Ottomans in the First World War exaggerates the artificiality of the state's territorial boundaries. While pre-First World War Kuwait was not part of the military frontier, it was part of the vilayet (province) of Baghdad and, later, Basra. Saddam alluded to that apparently shared history by claiming that Kuwait had historically been an integral part of Iraq (the 'Nineteenth Province').
Saddam was not the first ruler of Iraq to make such a claim: the Hashem- ite monarchy had done so in , and the republican regime of 'Abd alKarim Qasim echoed it in . The latter caused a brief war scare that brought British forces back to defend the newly independent state of Kuwait, Britain's protectorate since . Iraq repeatedly stated that the territories that composed Kuwait and Iraq had been acknowledged internationally in the late nineteenth century as belonging to the Ottoman Empire, and that the Ottoman imperial government had treated one as part of the other. The readiness of successive Iraqi regimes to cite Ottoman precedent when it suited them does not imply a serious interest in the pre-independence period of history. As an Arab nationalist, Saddam never hid his hatred for Ottoman imperialism: in , he even wrote an autobiographical novel that featured his grandfather fighting heroically against 'the Turks'. 1 They were a curse upon the Arab world, not only for their oppression, but also for their failure to fend off European advances. In Saddam's version of history, when 'the Arabs' saw the 'opportunity to be liberated from the darkness of the Ottoman era … malicious westerners' intervened. 2 In his view, by then the established view in Iraq, Britain separated the Kuwaiti 'branch' from the Iraqi 'trunk' in , when the government of India made a secret agreement with the sheikh of Kuwait, Mubarak al-Sabah. The agreement was the first step towards a British protectorate over the sheikhdom, out of which the post-Ottoman state of Kuwait was created in .
As Saddam's claim was baseless in international law, owing to Iraq's formal recognition in  of Kuwait's independence, he appealed to the court of public opinion, both in Iraq and abroad. By casting the attempt to absorb Kuwait as the righting of a historical wrong perpetrated by immoral European imperialists acting illegally, he tapped deep reserves of popular resentment among those, both inside and outside the Middle East, who attribute present-day problems to yesterday's actions by the imperialist West.
The evidence adduced by both sides in the dispute between Iran and Kuwait was culled largely from British archives. It is symptomatic of the Baathist regime's contemptuous attitude towards the Ottomans that Iraqi historians interested in the pre-national period are unable to read Ottoman documents. The state's lack of interest in promoting Ottoman studies is lastingly regrettable, as much of Iraq's collection of Ottoman-language documents will remain forever unread, reportedly having been destroyed in the arson and looting that plagued Baghdad after the fall of Saddam's regime in . Although the claims made by Iraq and Kuwait cannot easily be reconciled, neither's may be dismissed as fabrication. Working from similar sources, Iraqis and Kuwaitis draw different conclusions, because the British records they rely on are ambiguous about the status of Kuwait in the period preceding the expulsion of the Ottomans from the Persian Gulf during the First World War. The ambiguity resulted from the shift in Britain's interests in the region and the shifting interests of its local informants. The British, who lacked a permanent representative at Kuwait before , had to rely on hearsay for intelligence. The result was a plentiful supply of contradictory anecdotal evidence, available to both Iraqis and Kuwaitis.
Each side had to make the best use of a handful of uncontested facts, drawn from British records, about the last half-century of Ottoman rule in the Gulf region. The events of three years stand out in significance. The first was -, when 'Abdallah al-Sabah (sheikh of Kuwait from  to ) accepted the position of kaymakam (governor) of the newly created Ottoman kaza (district) of Kuwait. The kaza and the new mutasarrıflık (sub-province) of Nejd (comprising what is now eastern Saudi Arabia and Qatar) were added to the vilayet of Baghdad in . Upon 'Abdallah's death, his brother and successor, Muhammad (-), assumed the position of kaymakam, as did yet another brother, Mubarak (-), in , a year after he had assassinated Muhammad. From - until the First World War, the sheikh of Kuwait held a formal title and received (intermittently) an official stipend, and the Ottoman flag flew over Kuwait and on Kuwaiti ships. Iraq and Kuwait agree that Kuwait was tied politically to the Mesopotamian provinces of the Ottoman Empire. 1 They disagree about the nature of the tie.
The second year was , when a representative of the government of India made a secret agreement with Mubarak that gave Britain a veto over the admission of other foreign agents accredited to him and the granting of concessions that might enable foreigners to gain effective control over any Kuwaiti territory. In return, the government of India paid Mubarak , rupees and promised him Britain's 'good offices'. Although the agreement was kept secret until , it marks the first formal international recognition of Kuwait's autonomy. The third year was , in which a draft Anglo-Ottoman convention recognized Kuwait to be an 'autonomous' kaza of the Ottoman Empire. It also delimited Kuwait's boundaries along a line that the present-day IraqKuwait border generally follows. The convention was ratified by the Ottoman government, but not by the British government, before the outbreak of Anglo-Ottoman hostilities in November  halted the British ratification process. 1 These events are difficult to reconcile. Scholars from outside the Gulf expert in modern legal theory, who have tried to reconcile them, also have relied almost exclusively on British sources. David Finnie, who sympathizes with Kuwait's claims but acknowledges that the Kuwaiti-Ottoman relationship remains obscure, devotes most of his study to the post- period. 2 Majid Khadduri, who tries to establish the nature of the relationship, 3 comes to the odd conclusion that the agreement of  was probably legally valid because the Ottoman claim to Kuwait was 'the legacy of various legal transactions made at a time when the Ottoman territories … were considered outside the pale of International Law.' 4 Thus, the niceties of international law could be ignored. Such an argument failed to satisfy British officials who worried about the legal status of Kuwait in the early twentieth century. They were well aware that the Ottoman Empire had been recognized formally as part of the Concert of Europe, with the full legal rights under international law enjoyed by other European states, in the treaty of Paris of .
Iraqi historians, who naturally highlight the events between  and  -when Kuwait was formally incorporated into the vilayet of Baghdad until , when it passed into the newly formed vilayet of Basra, itself reabsorbed in  into Baghdad until reconstituted in  -challenge the legitimacy of everything that happened later. 5 They stress the use of the Ottoman flag, the acceptance of the office of kaymakam and its subservience to the valis of Baghdad and Basra in the provincial chain of command, and Kuwaiti participation in Ottoman military expeditions to eastern Arabia in  and Qatar in . In their view, the agreement of  was illegal and, not having been recognized formally by other parties, is irrelevant to the issue of the degree of Kuwait's autonomy. The convention of  confirmed that Kuwait was part of the vilayet of Basra, with autonomy limited to municipal affairs. That Britain failed to ratify the convention negated its validity as a legal precedent for establishing the border between Iraq and Kuwait. Feroz Ahmad, who is not Iraqi, questions the legality of the agreement of  without endorsing Iraq's territorial claim. 1 The counter-argument presented by Kuwaiti and other Arab historians belittles the events between  and . 2 In their view, Kuwait's tie to the Ottoman Empire was religious, not political. In an echo of a medieval European ruler's allegiance to the pope, Kuwait flew the Ottoman flag as a symbol of spiritual rather than political allegiance. The title of kaymakam was not functional but honorific, and Kuwait's forces joined Ottoman military campaigns only when it suited the sheikh's interests, when they served as allies, not as subordinates. These historians argue that the nature of Kuwait's relationship with the Ottoman Empire was understood by the British, whose agreement with Mubarak would have been worthless had he not been, in effect, independent. The convention of  demonstrated that Kuwait's autonomy was recognized by both Ottomans and British, even if administrative snags prevented the British from ratifying it before the outbreak of war. This version is accepted by Peter Sluglett, in an earlier article in this journal, who, like Finnie, relies largely on the same British sources as both Iraqis and Kuwaitis. 3 The crux of the disagreement is the nature of the relationship between Kuwait and the vilayets of Baghdad and Basra, in particular the view of the relationship held by Kuwaitis and the Ottoman state at the time. The British view of it varied. Before  and the rumours about first Russian, and then German, plans to terminate the railways they were building in the Middle East at the Gulf, British officials either ignored Kuwait or acknowledged it to be Ottoman territory. As late as April , the ambassador at Istanbul, Sir Clare Ford, stated explicitly to the Ottoman foreign minister, Said Pasha, that Britain recognized Ottoman sovereignty over the territory between Basra and Qatif, a port on the coast of Arabia slightly to the northwest of the Qatar peninsula. 4 The British volte-face in  is best illustrated by the viceroy of India, Lord Curzon, who had stated in a book he published in , Persia and the Persian Question, that Kuwait belonged to the territory over which 'the Ottoman dominion is established without dispute', words Germany used against Britain in later disputes over the Berlin-to-Baghdad railway. 1 Three months after he took office, in January , Curzon, with the approval of the India office and support of the foreign office, directed the political agent in the Gulf to conclude an agreement with the sheikh of Kuwait.
The shift in Curzon's, and Britain's, attitude was a matter of political expediency, not reasoned legal argument. The uncertainty about Kuwait's legal status, and the government's unwillingness to address the problem, are revealed in the minutes of a subcommittee of the committee for imperial defence from March . To the question of 'how we stand jurisprudentially in Koweit', the under-secretary of state for India, Sir Richmond Ritchie, replied: 'Whenever we (in the India office) write to the foreign office we always say, "The sheikh of Koweit, with whose status the secretary of state for foreign affairs is acquainted;" and similarly when the foreign office write to us they adopt a similar form.' 2 By default, it is left to Ottoman documents to define the nature of Kuwait's relationship with the Ottoman Empire. * * * * * K'   the Ottoman state can only be understood by recognizing the pressure to change (be it termed 'modernization', 'Westernization', or 'secularization') applied to the empire. Since the end of the seventeenth century, every major European state except Prussia/Germany had seized direct or indirect control over lands and populations that formed part of the Ottoman domains. The threat of partition continued until the dissolution of the empire in , in spite of the formal recognition of Ottoman rights in . Conscious of the need to use the legal tools formally accorded to it, the Ottoman Empire sought, after , to mark its territory with the symbols used by the European powers: flags and legally defined administrative structures that demonstrated effective control. The difficulty lay in finding a way that did not destabilize social structures that still operated according to traditional practices unaffected by modern ideas of international law and the centralized state. The vali of Baghdad in -, Midhat Pasha, found a method acceptable to both the central government and the Kuwaitis. On  February , he sent to Istanbul the following report on Kuwait and how it came to fly the Ottoman flag:
The place known as Kuwait is a merchant port of two or three thousand houses lying on the coast twenty-four hours south of Basra. While in the early days it was one of those areas attached to Basra, it later somehow gradually won the status of an independent community, because geographic barriers prevented its supervision and it thus was left on its own. The Franks [Christian Europeans] considering it a 'Republic', it is so marked on [their] maps and is recognized as completely separate and independent. The people of this place, an old part of the well-protected [Ottoman] domains, all belong to the Sunni madhhab [the collective body of four schools of tradition-based Islamic law, the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali] and, all of them being traders, they fly a special form of the Ottoman flag on most of their seven or eight hundred ships. Nevertheless, because they did not want to obey Basra in the past, [Kuwait] remained in an isolated and independent condition and administration. In spite of that, given the current condition of Bahrain under British domination and foreigners' schemes to send ships to seize the Hasa and Qatif coasts lying between Kuwait and Bahrain [by this Midhat refers to suspected British schemes to seize what is now the Gulf coast of Saudi Arabia, following the government of India's intervention in Bahrain in  to install a sheikh of its choosing], correspondence was initiated through various channels for the purpose of finding a means to bring Kuwait under [Ottoman] control and administration. It is clear that, once foreigners become entrenched on the [HasaQatif] coast, they will come in turn to Kuwait. Were we to bring this Kuwait under proper administration, it would smooth the way to saving the area beyond it through the naval force now being organized in Basra, and it is probable that [then] a solution for even the Bahrain problem could be found. Since the sheikhs of Kuwait have long received income from  kare of dates [from Faw, south of Basra in Iraq], worth -, gurus, this income was cut off, in order to ease the proposition [that Kuwait come under Ottoman control].
During my most recent trip to Basra, [Kuwait's] sheikhs and elders were brought there. Regarding their comments and the wishes and desires which they showed, [they said that] while they are proud to be subjects of the Sublime [Ottoman] State, their basic fear is to come under impositions such as customs duties and taxes. Since it is the case that the Sublime State in no way needs them, and its basic goal is [to establish its] patronage and protection, the requirements of the situation on this subject were explained to them at length. Then they drew up and submitted a protocol, which included the request that the current sheikh be given the title and office of kaymakam. It also asked for the official appointment of judges with permission to exercise their authority as before according to the Shafi'i madhhab, since most of the people of the said town are followers of the Shafi'i practice -although there are also some followers of the Maliki and Hanbali madhhabs as well -and sharia judicial authority is organized according to the Shafi'i school of law. The protocol requests also that imperial warrants be given to five khutbi mosques [the main mosques in which congregants gathered for the Friday midday prayers and sermon, during which the sultan's name presumably would be invoked thereafter, the customary acknowledgement of political legitimacy] from among the sacred mosques [of Kuwait]. The necessary decrees have been given in writing, and the matter of the letters of appointment and imperial warrants has been sent by telegraph to the illustrious interior ministry. It has been decided in accordance with current needs that, in order to give [Kuwait] a greater show of order, one hundred military gendarmes should be stationed there, with their salaries paid by [the Kuwaiti leaders]. This, too, should be mutually agreed and brought into effect immediately upon the imminent return of the current kaymakam, who is at present in the Hijaz. 1 The year after writing this report, Midhat called at Kuwait in November , on his way to inspect newly conquered Ottoman territory in eastern Arabia. The sheikh-kaymakam 'Abdallah had come to Faw to meet Midhat, who then went out of his way to visit him in Kuwait and to tour the town with its magnificent harbour. His description of the visit embellishes, and alters, parts of his previous report.
First, Midhat justifies the detour to Kuwait by noting the attention and services rendered by the sheikh of Kuwait: Several points leap out from the two documents. Geography made Kuwait neither politically dependent upon, nor answerable to, Basra. It not only had socio-economic ties to southern Iraq but also ties throughout the Gulf and Arabia that reached as far as India and East Africa. Owing to its autonomy, Midhat had to apply financial pressure to persuade Kuwait's leaders to come to Basra, acknowledge Ottoman suzerainty, and recognize the legal symbols of Ottoman control: the Ottoman flag and an Ottoman administrator (the sheikh-kaymakam). In turn, the Ottoman authorities recognized the limits of what the Kuwaitis would accept, and their own inability to control the town of Kuwait; an earlier Ottoman scheme to collect customs duties had been dropped in  owing to the certainty of Kuwaiti resistance. 2 The Ottoman state thus granted Kuwait a number of exceptional privileges, seen to be in operation, and confirmed, during Midhat's visit. Unlike every other part of the vilayet of Baghdad (including the mutasarrıflık of Nejd after ), Kuwait never was liable for customs or other Ottoman taxes, its inhabitants were not subject to military conscription, and no Ottoman official other than the sheikh-kaymakam resided there. Two kaymakamlıks, Kuwait and Qurna, now a town in Iraq, were dependent on Basra; in the Basra provincial gazette of -, twenty-two officials are listed as serving in Qurna, where normal Ottoman direct administration had been introduced, whereas only the kaymakam is listed under Kuwait. 3 Although Midhat's first report suggests the desirability of posting a detachment of gendarmes in Kuwait, no such force was ever raised. Next, again unlike the Ottomans' conduct in any other part of the empire except perhaps the Hijaz, 4 the Ottomans made no attempt to alter the judicial system or to appoint judges learned in Hanafi law, the madhhab followed by the Ottoman state. This is particularly remarkable given Midhat's statement in the second report that a few Hanafis lived in Mubarak to allow it to post at Kuwait any other Ottoman official, such as a harbour master. Such success in withstanding the imperial government's intermittent pressure may have led British officials to suppose that Kuwait was independent.
In Ottoman eyes, the Ottoman flag and the title of kaymakam were not meaningless: they were meant to establish beyond reasonable doubt that Kuwait was Ottoman territory. The successive sheikh-kaymakams, 'Abdallah, Muhammad, and Mubarak, who received stipends from the imperial government, were expected, in return, to maintain order and to uphold Ottoman rights in their territory. 1 Even though Mubarak made the agreement with the government of India in  before he began to receive the stipend, he had already accepted the position of kaymakam, with its rights and responsibilities, which he confirmed by accepting the stipend when it was offered. He had acknowledged most clearly in assuming the office of kaymakam in  that Kuwait was Ottoman territory, and he reaffirmed his loyalty to the sultan in  and , despite signing the agreement with the government of India. According to Britain's understanding of constitutional relationships, he had given up the right to make agreements with foreign states. Thus, Kuwait's claim that Mubarak was an independent ruler not tied to the Ottoman state is doubtful.
Mubarak's actions followed from the nature of political power in nineteenth-century Arabia, 2 where nothing resembled the impersonal, corporate state familiar to Europeans. Such political authority as was recognized by most of Arabia's inhabitants was held by the leading families that provided the sheikhs of tribes or towns, like the Al Sabah in Kuwait. Allegiance to an individual was revocable. As authority rested with the family, not the individual, a sheikh who failed to serve the community, or was not politically astute, could be displaced by a relative. This happened in , when Mubarak murdered Muhammad and another half-brother, Jarrah. The imperial government recognized customary familial authority when debating whether to replace him with another member of the Al Sabah in . The limits to the authority of any single member of the Al Sabah, even when recognized as sheikh, is illustrated by Midhat's comment that no taxes were collected in Kuwait. Mubarak's position was exceptionally vulnerable, under threat not only from followers of his murdered brothers, but also owing to the probable displeasure of the Ottoman state, whose representative the late sheikh-kaymakam had been.
Mubarak's actions are explained by the need to buttress his authority. The office of kaymakam, which he worked hard to be appointed to by Kuwait's Ottoman overlord, nullified the threat of Ottoman action over the murder of his predecessor. The agreement with the government of India provided insurance not only against the Ottomans but also local rivals, who might have offered privileges to the British in return for recognition once Mubarak was overthrown. The agreement had the second advantage that, in binding his descendants, it increased the likelihood that his line would squeeze rival lineages of the Al Sabah out of contention for the leadership of Kuwait. With the backing of a European great power accustomed to dealing with centralized states and preferring to work with one ruler rather than a family or group of families, Mubarak extended the customary rights of Al Sabah sheikhs over Kuwait's inhabitants. 1 In , he introduced a system of tax collection, for the first time. Nonetheless, in , he explained to an Ottoman army officer who had deserted, Hüseyin Hüsni, that he had accepted the government of India's protection only for himself and his personal rights; the land and other property of Kuwait belonged to the Ottoman state. 2 In his own eyes, he maintained multiple allegiances.
If Kuwait's claim always to have been independent seems doubtful, Iraq's claim that Britain carved Kuwait out of Iraq during the late Ottoman period is more so. Ignoring the fact that the state of Iraq is a post-Ottoman creation, it is clear from the Ottoman records that Kuwait never was fully incorporated into any of the vilayets later incorporated in Iraq by Britain and the League of Nations after the First World War. The imperial Ottoman government recognized the autonomy of the sheikh in managing Kuwait's internal affairs: it ratified the Anglo-Ottoman convention of  so quickly because the terms both confirmed the relationship between Kuwait and the imperial government settled in , and formally recognized Kuwait as Ottoman territory, a step both the foreign office and government of India had avoided taking since .
The Anglo-Ottoman convention also settled the territorial extent of Kuwait. Iraq, even when not contesting Kuwait's claim to have been independent since , has claimed that Britain, under the convention, delimited the border between Kuwait and the remainder of the vilayet of Basra along a line that was too generous to Kuwait. 3 That delimitation set the border of today. The Ottoman records ignore the issue of the border's correct location. The area in question was an economic wasteland, without permanent settlements: running a line through it, on one side of which the sheikh of Kuwait would exercise 'authority', on the other the vali of Basra, would have seemed strange to those familiar with the area before . The settlements closest to the frontier -Zubayr, Umm Qasr, and Safwanwere placed on Basra's side of the line because they had been administered from Basra, to the extent that they were administered at all, at least from the beginning of the twentieth century. 1 Although Midhat's second report states that Kuwait was surrounded by tribes 'under its patronage and control', the point south of Zubayr, Umm Qasr, and Safwan at which Mubarak's influence became paramount (if it existed) had to be guessed. The imperial government's repeated requests to officials in Basra for information about such spheres of influence show that it did not know of any areas under Basra's control that were placed in  on Kuwait's side of the frontier. 2 The border's placement in  cannot be said to have been unjust at the time.
* * * * * T   of states formerly part of the Ottoman Empire written by all sides in the Iraq-Kuwait dispute are flawed. The Ottoman records show that Kuwait, though not independent in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, was autonomous. It was not directly controlled by the vilayet of Baghdad or, later, Basra, even between  and , the period of most effective Ottoman authority in the Gulf. If the extent of Ottoman territorial sovereignty or the structure of Ottoman provincial administration in the late nineteenth century were valid grounds for redrawing present-day frontiers, Iraq would have a better claim to the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia and to Qatar than to Kuwait. They formed part of the mutasarrıflık of Nejd, which first the vilayet of Baghdad and then the vilayet of Basra administered from  to . Such a claim would count for little in the court of public opinion, not only on account of geography, given the distance separating Qatar and the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia from Iraq, but also because British imperialism could not be blamed. Basra lost control of Nejd in  when 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Sa'ud (founder of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia) and his Arab followers evicted the Ottomans by force, the sort of activity attributed implausibly by Saddam Hussein to his grandfather. An Iraqi historical claim to Saudi Arabia would be derided; the Iraqi historical claim to
